

### A Conceptual Perspective on Vertical Restraints: Resale Price Maintenance and Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses

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#### **Resale Price Maintenance (RPM)**

- RPM involves the manufacturer: fixing the price for the retailer; recommending a price to the retailer; establishing a minimum price, or, a maximum price for the retailer.
- Hard core restriction under VBER where the agreement has the direct or indirect object of establishing a fixed or minimum resale price to be observed by the buyer (VBER Guidelines, [48]).
- VBER Guidelines recognise efficiencies from RPM for the first time (assessed under Art 101(3) TFEU).
- Introductory period of a new product to induce distributors to better promote the product and expand overall demand (VBER Guidelines, [225]).
- Even fixed prices may be necessary for a short term (2-6 weeks) low price campaign in a system with a uniform distribution format (eg franchise).

- Economics literature incorporating specific features of online markets still nascent.
- **Data** provided by online retail can be used for competitive advantage by retailers (eg browsing history, etc) (Mallapragada et al, 2016).
- **Transparency** allows better monitoring by manufacturer of retail prices.
- Effect may be aggravated due to use of 'pricing software' which automatically adapts retail prices to those of leading competitors ('algorithmic pricing').
- Internet exacerbates the free-riding problem ('showrooming') online retail vs brick-and-mortar (Wu et al, 2015).

### Internet also demonstrates that formalistic distinctions between different types of VRs is not appropriate for understanding competitive effects of conduct.



- MFC (aka MFN) clause: a promise by one party, eg supplier, that he will treat a given customer as well as the supplier treats his best customer.
- <u>Platform MFC clause</u>: seller will charge no higher price on Platform A than on Platform B, ie promise to Platform A that it will get the best price *across platforms*.
- They may **soften competition** between platforms or **foreclose** new platforms and lead to higher prices. (No incentive for platform to lower commission to decrease price because price will be matched.)
- <u>But</u> may also prevent free-riding on platform investments, and, enable remuneration for transaction platforms (ie commission).

#### **Platform MFCs blur the line between horizontal vs** vertical restraints.

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**Normal MFC** 



p1 ≤ p2

Links prices between different customers of the same seller.



Links prices for the same customer buying from different (competing) outlets.

### **Platform MFC**

#### Decisional practice has not been consistent.



	Horizontal	Vertical	Object	Effect	Prohibition	Commitments
Apple (US)	x		x		x	
Apple (EU)			x			x
Booking/ Expedia/IHG (UK)		X	X			X
HRS & Booking (DE)		X		X	x (all MFCs)	
<i>Booking</i> (FR, SE, IT)		X				x
Booking /HRS/ Expedia (CH)	X	x		x	x (wide MFCs)	
PCW (UK)		X			x (wide MFCs)	

In DE, FR, SE, IT and UK, authorities are all applying the <u>same</u> legal provision (Art 101 TFEU).

# Features of e-commerce may require a rethink of the approach to VRs.



- Question of the **legal position** of an online platform Agency? Retailer? Sui generis?
- Who is imposing the restraint on whom (ie who is downstream and who is upstream)?
- What is a vertical restraint vs a horizontal restraint?
- **Theory of harm** horizontal or vertical or both?
- Different contractual promises may have similar outcomes (eg Price-Matching-Guarantees).

### Effect-based approach with specific attention to the features of the Internet essential in reaching the correct outcome.