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The Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic initiated proceedings in the matter of a possible cartel agreement in the field of public procurements (so-called „bid rigging" ) financed by the EU funds

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 The Division of Cartels of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic began on 9th September 2013 the proceedings based on its own initiative against twelve undertakings with regard to participation and bidding in public procurements financed by the Operational Programme Education using the financial resources from the European Social Fund and national resources.

Based on the evidence gathered, the Office suspected twelve undertakings from the agreement not to compete in the bidding in the public procurements within projects financed from the EU funds. Thus, public procurements lose their meaning, which is to ensure the most efficient way of using public resources. Such conduct may be in conflict with the Act No. 136/2001 Coll. on Protection of Competition as amended that prohibits agreements between competitors restricting competition.



To confirm the suspicion and gather further evidence the Office, prior to proceedings, carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of several undertakings in the towns of the Trenčín region, Bratislava region and Banská Bystrica region. During the inspections the employees of the Office gathered various documents, including e - mail communication.



Cartels in public procurement (so-called "bid rigging ") are arrangements between some or all bidders in a tender. Cooperation may take the form of agreements on prices, sharing contracts or other form of coordination, including an agreement not to submit a bid or an agreement on rotation of contracts.



Since these agreements represent horizontal agreements between direct competitors, which are considered as hard-core cartels, cartel participant may be fined up to 10 % of their turnover for the proceeding closed accounting period. A cartel participant has an option to fully avoid a fine if he was the first to provide, on its own initiative, decisive evidence to prove a violation of the prohibited agreement or was the first to provide, on its own initiative, information and evidence being decisive to perform an inspection. In case a cartel participant provides, on its own initiative, significant evidence, which itself may not be sufficient, but in combination with information and documents already available to the Office, enable the Office to prove a prohibited agreement, the Office shall impose a fine reduced by up to 50% of the amount of the fine that the Office would otherwise impose. Detailed conditions of non-imposing or reducing a fine are summarised in the document “Leniency program” http://www.antimon.gov.sk/files/30/2009/leniency5(k).rtf.



In case it is proved that bidder participated in the collusion in public procurement, such bidder shall not take part in public procurements for three years since a final decision confirming existence of an agreement restricting competition is issued. The prohibition does not apply to those who qualify for leniency under the leniency program.



Initiation of proceedings neither implies that undertakings are guilty of anti-competitive behaviour; nor prejudge the outcome of the investigation itself.The Division of Cartels of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic began on 9th September 2013 the proceedings based on its own initiative against twelve undertakings with regard to participation and bidding in public procurements financed by the Operational Programme Education using the financial resources from the European Social Fund and national resources.

Based on the evidence gathered, the Office suspected twelve undertakings from the agreement not to compete in the bidding in the public procurements within projects financed from the EU funds. Thus, public procurements lose their meaning, which is to ensure the most efficient way of using public resources. Such conduct may be in conflict with the Act No. 136/2001 Coll. on Protection of Competition as amended that prohibits agreements between competitors restricting competition.



To confirm the suspicion and gather further evidence the Office, prior to proceedings, carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of several undertakings in the towns of the Trenčín region, Bratislava region and Banská Bystrica region. During the inspections the employees of the Office gathered various documents, including e - mail communication.



Cartels in public procurement (so-called "bid rigging ") are arrangements between some or all bidders in a tender. Cooperation may take the form of agreements on prices, sharing contracts or other form of coordination, including an agreement not to submit a bid or an agreement on rotation of contracts.



Since these agreements represent horizontal agreements between direct competitors, which are considered as hard-core cartels, cartel participant may be fined up to 10 % of their turnover for the proceeding closed accounting period. A cartel participant has an option to fully avoid a fine if he was the first to provide, on its own initiative, decisive evidence to prove a violation of the prohibited agreement or was the first to provide, on its own initiative, information and evidence being decisive to perform an inspection. In case a cartel participant provides, on its own initiative, significant evidence, which itself may not be sufficient, but in combination with information and documents already available to the Office, enable the Office to prove a prohibited agreement, the Office shall impose a fine reduced by up to 50% of the amount of the fine that the Office would otherwise impose. Detailed conditions of non-imposing or reducing a fine are summarised in the document “Leniency program” http://www.antimon.gov.sk/files/30/2009/leniency5(k).rtf.



In case it is proved that bidder participated in the collusion in public procurement, such bidder shall not take part in public procurements for three years since a final decision confirming existence of an agreement restricting competition is issued. The prohibition does not apply to those who qualify for leniency under the leniency program.



Initiation of proceedings neither implies that undertakings are guilty of anti-competitive behaviour; nor prejudge the outcome of the investigation itself.The Division of Cartels of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic began on 9th September 2013 the proceedings based on its own initiative against twelve undertakings with regard to participation and bidding in public procurements financed by the Operational Programme Education using the financial resources from the European Social Fund and national resources.

Based on the evidence gathered, the Office suspected twelve undertakings from the agreement not to compete in the bidding in the public procurements within projects financed from the EU funds. Thus, public procurements lose their meaning, which is to ensure the most efficient way of using public resources. Such conduct may be in conflict with the Act No. 136/2001 Coll. on Protection of Competition as amended that prohibits agreements between competitors restricting competition.



To confirm the suspicion and gather further evidence the Office, prior to proceedings, carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of several undertakings in the towns of the Trenčín region, Bratislava region and Banská Bystrica region. During the inspections the employees of the Office gathered various documents, including e - mail communication.



Cartels in public procurement (so-called "bid rigging ") are arrangements between some or all bidders in a tender. Cooperation may take the form of agreements on prices, sharing contracts or other form of coordination, including an agreement not to submit a bid or an agreement on rotation of contracts.



Since these agreements represent horizontal agreements between direct competitors, which are considered as hard-core cartels, cartel participant may be fined up to 10 % of their turnover for the proceeding closed accounting period. A cartel participant has an option to fully avoid a fine if he was the first to provide, on its own initiative, decisive evidence to prove a violation of the prohibited agreement or was the first to provide, on its own initiative, information and evidence being decisive to perform an inspection. In case a cartel participant provides, on its own initiative, significant evidence, which itself may not be sufficient, but in combination with information and documents already available to the Office, enable the Office to prove a prohibited agreement, the Office shall impose a fine reduced by up to 50% of the amount of the fine that the Office would otherwise impose. Detailed conditions of non-imposing or reducing a fine are summarised in the document “Leniency program” http://www.antimon.gov.sk/files/30/2009/leniency5(k).rtf.



In case it is proved that bidder participated in the collusion in public procurement, such bidder shall not take part in public procurements for three years since a final decision confirming existence of an agreement restricting competition is issued. The prohibition does not apply to those who qualify for leniency under the leniency program.



Initiation of proceedings neither implies that undertakings are guilty of anti-competitive behaviour; nor prejudge the outcome of the investigation itself.The Division of Cartels of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic began on 9th September 2013 the proceedings based on its own initiative against twelve undertakings with regard to participation and bidding in public procurements financed by the Operational Programme Education using the financial resources from the European Social Fund and national resources.

Based on the evidence gathered, the Office suspected twelve undertakings from the agreement not to compete in the bidding in the public procurements within projects financed from the EU funds. Thus, public procurements lose their meaning, which is to ensure the most efficient way of using public resources. Such conduct may be in conflict with the Act No. 136/2001 Coll. on Protection of Competition as amended that prohibits agreements between competitors restricting competition.



To confirm the suspicion and gather further evidence the Office, prior to proceedings, carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of several undertakings in the towns of the Trenčín region, Bratislava region and Banská Bystrica region. During the inspections the employees of the Office gathered various documents, including e - mail communication.



Cartels in public procurement (so-called "bid rigging ") are arrangements between some or all bidders in a tender. Cooperation may take the form of agreements on prices, sharing contracts or other form of coordination, including an agreement not to submit a bid or an agreement on rotation of contracts.



Since these agreements represent horizontal agreements between direct competitors, which are considered as hard-core cartels, cartel participant may be fined up to 10 % of their turnover for the proceeding closed accounting period. A cartel participant has an option to fully avoid a fine if he was the first to provide, on its own initiative, decisive evidence to prove a violation of the prohibited agreement or was the first to provide, on its own initiative, information and evidence being decisive to perform an inspection. In case a cartel participant provides, on its own initiative, significant evidence, which itself may not be sufficient, but in combination with information and documents already available to the Office, enable the Office to prove a prohibited agreement, the Office shall impose a fine reduced by up to 50% of the amount of the fine that the Office would otherwise impose. Detailed conditions of non-imposing or reducing a fine are summarised in the document “Leniency program” http://www.antimon.gov.sk/files/30/2009/leniency5(k).rtf.



In case it is proved that bidder participated in the collusion in public procurement, such bidder shall not take part in public procurements for three years since a final decision confirming existence of an agreement restricting competition is issued. The prohibition does not apply to those who qualify for leniency under the leniency program.



Initiation of proceedings neither implies that undertakings are guilty of anti-competitive behaviour; nor prejudge the outcome of the investigation itself.The Division of Cartels of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic began on 9th September 2013 the proceedings based on its own initiative against twelve undertakings with regard to participation and bidding in public procurements financed by the Operational Programme Education using the financial resources from the European Social Fund and national resources.

Based on the evidence gathered, the Office suspected twelve undertakings from the agreement not to compete in the bidding in the public procurements within projects financed from the EU funds. Thus, public procurements lose their meaning, which is to ensure the most efficient way of using public resources. Such conduct may be in conflict with the Act No. 136/2001 Coll. on Protection of Competition as amended that prohibits agreements between competitors restricting competition.



To confirm the suspicion and gather further evidence the Office, prior to proceedings, carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of several undertakings in the towns of the Trenčín region, Bratislava region and Banská Bystrica region. During the inspections the employees of the Office gathered various documents, including e - mail communication.



Cartels in public procurement (so-called "bid rigging ") are arrangements between some or all bidders in a tender. Cooperation may take the form of agreements on prices, sharing contracts or other form of coordination, including an agreement not to submit a bid or an agreement on rotation of contracts.



Since these agreements represent horizontal agreements between direct competitors, which are considered as hard-core cartels, cartel participant may be fined up to 10 % of their turnover for the proceeding closed accounting period. A cartel participant has an option to fully avoid a fine if he was the first to provide, on its own initiative, decisive evidence to prove a violation of the prohibited agreement or was the first to provide, on its own initiative, information and evidence being decisive to perform an inspection. In case a cartel participant provides, on its own initiative, significant evidence, which itself may not be sufficient, but in combination with information and documents already available to the Office, enable the Office to prove a prohibited agreement, the Office shall impose a fine reduced by up to 50% of the amount of the fine that the Office would otherwise impose. Detailed conditions of non-imposing or reducing a fine are summarised in the document “Leniency program” http://www.antimon.gov.sk/files/30/2009/leniency5(k).rtf.



In case it is proved that bidder participated in the collusion in public procurement, such bidder shall not take part in public procurements for three years since a final decision confirming existence of an agreement restricting competition is issued. The prohibition does not apply to those who qualify for leniency under the leniency program.



Initiation of proceedings neither implies that undertakings are guilty of anti-competitive behaviour; nor prejudge the outcome of the investigation itself.The Division of Cartels of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic began on 9th September 2013 the proceedings based on its own initiative against twelve undertakings with regard to participation and bidding in public procurements financed by the Operational Programme Education using the financial resources from the European Social Fund and national resources.

Based on the evidence gathered, the Office suspected twelve undertakings from the agreement not to compete in the bidding in the public procurements within projects financed from the EU funds. Thus, public procurements lose their meaning, which is to ensure the most efficient way of using public resources. Such conduct may be in conflict with the Act No. 136/2001 Coll. on Protection of Competition as amended that prohibits agreements between competitors restricting competition.



To confirm the suspicion and gather further evidence the Office, prior to proceedings, carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of several undertakings in the towns of the Trenčín region, Bratislava region and Banská Bystrica region. During the inspections the employees of the Office gathered various documents, including e - mail communication.



Cartels in public procurement (so-called "bid rigging ") are arrangements between some or all bidders in a tender. Cooperation may take the form of agreements on prices, sharing contracts or other form of coordination, including an agreement not to submit a bid or an agreement on rotation of contracts.



Since these agreements represent horizontal agreements between direct competitors, which are considered as hard-core cartels, cartel participant may be fined up to 10 % of their turnover for the proceeding closed accounting period. A cartel participant has an option to fully avoid a fine if he was the first to provide, on its own initiative, decisive evidence to prove a violation of the prohibited agreement or was the first to provide, on its own initiative, information and evidence being decisive to perform an inspection. In case a cartel participant provides, on its own initiative, significant evidence, which itself may not be sufficient, but in combination with information and documents already available to the Office, enable the Office to prove a prohibited agreement, the Office shall impose a fine reduced by up to 50% of the amount of the fine that the Office would otherwise impose. Detailed conditions of non-imposing or reducing a fine are summarised in the document “Leniency program” http://www.antimon.gov.sk/files/30/2009/leniency5(k).rtf.



In case it is proved that bidder participated in the collusion in public procurement, such bidder shall not take part in public procurements for three years since a final decision confirming existence of an agreement restricting competition is issued. The prohibition does not apply to those who qualify for leniency under the leniency program.



Initiation of proceedings neither implies that undertakings are guilty of anti-competitive behaviour; nor prejudge the outcome of the investigation itself.The Division of Cartels of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic began on 9th September 2013 the proceedings based on its own initiative against twelve undertakings with regard to participation and bidding in public procurements financed by the Operational Programme Education using the financial resources from the European Social Fund and national resources.

Based on the evidence gathered, the Office suspected twelve undertakings from the agreement not to compete in the bidding in the public procurements within projects financed from the EU funds. Thus, public procurements lose their meaning, which is to ensure the most efficient way of using public resources. Such conduct may be in conflict with the Act No. 136/2001 Coll. on Protection of Competition as amended that prohibits agreements between competitors restricting competition.



To confirm the suspicion and gather further evidence the Office, prior to proceedings, carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of several undertakings in the towns of the Trenčín region, Bratislava region and Banská Bystrica region. During the inspections the employees of the Office gathered various documents, including e - mail communication.



Cartels in public procurement (so-called "bid rigging ") are arrangements between some or all bidders in a tender. Cooperation may take the form of agreements on prices, sharing contracts or other form of coordination, including an agreement not to submit a bid or an agreement on rotation of contracts.



Since these agreements represent horizontal agreements between direct competitors, which are considered as hard-core cartels, cartel participant may be fined up to 10 % of their turnover for the proceeding closed accounting period. A cartel participant has an option to fully avoid a fine if he was the first to provide, on its own initiative, decisive evidence to prove a violation of the prohibited agreement or was the first to provide, on its own initiative, information and evidence being decisive to perform an inspection. In case a cartel participant provides, on its own initiative, significant evidence, which itself may not be sufficient, but in combination with information and documents already available to the Office, enable the Office to prove a prohibited agreement, the Office shall impose a fine reduced by up to 50% of the amount of the fine that the Office would otherwise impose. Detailed conditions of non-imposing or reducing a fine are summarised in the document “Leniency program” http://www.antimon.gov.sk/files/30/2009/leniency5(k).rtf.



In case it is proved that bidder participated in the collusion in public procurement, such bidder shall not take part in public procurements for three years since a final decision confirming existence of an agreement restricting competition is issued. The prohibition does not apply to those who qualify for leniency under the leniency program.



Initiation of proceedings neither implies that undertakings are guilty of anti-competitive behaviour; nor prejudge the outcome of the investigation itselfThe Division of Cartels of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic began on 9th September 2013 the proceedings based on its own initiative against twelve undertakings with regard to participation and bidding in public procurements financed by the Operational Programme Education using the financial resources from the European Social Fund and national resources.

Based on the evidence gathered, the Office suspected twelve undertakings from the agreement not to compete in the bidding in the public procurements within projects financed from the EU funds. Thus, public procurements lose their meaning, which is to ensure the most efficient way of using public resources. Such conduct may be in conflict with the Act No. 136/2001 Coll. on Protection of Competition as amended that prohibits agreements between competitors restricting competition.


To confirm the suspicion and gather further evidence the Office, prior to proceedings, carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of several undertakings in the towns of the Trenčín region, Bratislava region and Banská Bystrica region. During the inspections the employees of the Office gathered various documents, including e - mail communication.


Cartels in public procurement (so-called "bid rigging ") are arrangements between some or all bidders in a tender. Cooperation may take the form of agreements on prices, sharing contracts or other form of coordination, including an agreement not to submit a bid or an agreement on rotation of contracts.


Since these agreements represent horizontal agreements between direct competitors, which are considered as hard-core cartels, cartel participant may be fined up to 10 % of their turnover for the proceeding closed accounting period. A cartel participant has an option to fully avoid a fine if he was the first to provide, on its own initiative, decisive evidence to prove a violation of the prohibited agreement or was the first to provide, on its own initiative, information and evidence being decisive to perform an inspection. In case a cartel participant provides, on its own initiative, significant evidence, which itself may not be sufficient, but in combination with information and documents already available to the Office, enable the Office to prove a prohibited agreement, the Office shall impose a fine reduced by up to 50% of the amount of the fine that the Office would otherwise impose. Detailed conditions of non-imposing or reducing a fine are summarised in the document “Leniency program” http://www.antimon.gov.sk/files/30/2009/leniency5(k).rtf.


In case it is proved that bidder participated in the collusion in public procurement, such bidder shall not take part in public procurements for three years since a final decision confirming existence of an agreement restricting competition is issued. The prohibition does not apply to those who qualify for leniency under the leniency program.


Initiation of proceedings neither implies that undertakings are guilty of anti-competitive behaviour; nor prejudge the outcome of the investigation itself.The Division of Cartels of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic began on 9th September 2013 the proceedings based on its own initiative against twelve undertakings with regard to participation and bidding in public procurements financed by the Operational Programme Education using the financial resources from the European Social Fund and national resources.

Based on the evidence gathered, the Office suspected twelve undertakings from the agreement not to compete in the bidding in the public procurements within projects financed from the EU funds. Thus, public procurements lose their meaning, which is to ensure the most efficient way of using public resources. Such conduct may be in conflict with the Act No. 136/2001 Coll. on Protection of Competition as amended that prohibits agreements between competitors restricting competition.


To confirm the suspicion and gather further evidence the Office, prior to proceedings, carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of several undertakings in the towns of the Trenčín region, Bratislava region and Banská Bystrica region. During the inspections the employees of the Office gathered various documents, including e - mail communication.


Cartels in public procurement (so-called "bid rigging ") are arrangements between some or all bidders in a tender. Cooperation may take the form of agreements on prices, sharing contracts or other form of coordination, including an agreement not to submit a bid or an agreement on rotation of contracts.


Since these agreements represent horizontal agreements between direct competitors, which are considered as hard-core cartels, cartel participant may be fined up to 10 % of their turnover for the proceeding closed accounting period. A cartel participant has an option to fully avoid a fine if he was the first to provide, on its own initiative, decisive evidence to prove a violation of the prohibited agreement or was the first to provide, on its own initiative, information and evidence being decisive to perform an inspection. In case a cartel participant provides, on its own initiative, significant evidence, which itself may not be sufficient, but in combination with information and documents already available to the Office, enable the Office to prove a prohibited agreement, the Office shall impose a fine reduced by up to 50% of the amount of the fine that the Office would otherwise impose. Detailed conditions of non-imposing or reducing a fine are summarised in the document “Leniency program” http://www.antimon.gov.sk/files/30/2009/leniency5(k).rtf.


In case it is proved that bidder participated in the collusion in public procurement, such bidder shall not take part in public procurements for three years since a final decision confirming existence of an agreement restricting competition is issued. The prohibition does not apply to those who qualify for leniency under the leniency program.


Initiation of proceedings neither implies that undertakings are guilty of anti-competitive behaviour; nor prejudge the outcome of the investigation itself.The Division of Cartels of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic began on 9th September 2013 the proceedings based on its own initiative against twelve undertakings with regard to participation and bidding in public procurements financed by the Operational Programme Education using the financial resources from the European Social Fund and national resources.

Based on the evidence gathered, the Office suspected twelve undertakings from the agreement not to compete in the bidding in the public procurements within projects financed from the EU funds. Thus, public procurements lose their meaning, which is to ensure the most efficient way of using public resources. Such conduct may be in conflict with the Act No. 136/2001 Coll. on Protection of Competition as amended that prohibits agreements between competitors restricting competition.


To confirm the suspicion and gather further evidence the Office, prior to proceedings, carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of several undertakings in the towns of the Trenčín region, Bratislava region and Banská Bystrica region. During the inspections the employees of the Office gathered various documents, including e - mail communication.


Cartels in public procurement (so-called "bid rigging ") are arrangements between some or all bidders in a tender. Cooperation may take the form of agreements on prices, sharing contracts or other form of coordination, including an agreement not to submit a bid or an agreement on rotation of contracts.


Since these agreements represent horizontal agreements between direct competitors, which are considered as hard-core cartels, cartel participant may be fined up to 10 % of their turnover for the proceeding closed accounting period. A cartel participant has an option to fully avoid a fine if he was the first to provide, on its own initiative, decisive evidence to prove a violation of the prohibited agreement or was the first to provide, on its own initiative, information and evidence being decisive to perform an inspection. In case a cartel participant provides, on its own initiative, significant evidence, which itself may not be sufficient, but in combination with information and documents already available to the Office, enable the Office to prove a prohibited agreement, the Office shall impose a fine reduced by up to 50% of the amount of the fine that the Office would otherwise impose. Detailed conditions of non-imposing or reducing a fine are summarised in the document “Leniency program” http://www.antimon.gov.sk/files/30/2009/leniency5(k).rtf.


In case it is proved that bidder participated in the collusion in public procurement, such bidder shall not take part in public procurements for three years since a final decision confirming existence of an agreement restricting competition is issued. The prohibition does not apply to those who qualify for leniency under the leniency program.


Initiation of proceedings neither implies that undertakings are guilty of anti-competitive behaviour; nor prejudge the outcome of the investigation itself
The Division of Cartels of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic began on 9th September 2013 the proceedings based on its own initiative against twelve undertakings with regard to participation and bidding in public procurements financed by the Operational Programme Education using the financial resources from the European Social Fund and national resources.
Based on the evidence gathered, the Office suspected twelve undertakings from the agreement not to compete in the bidding in the public procurements within projects financed from the EU funds. Thus, public procurements lose their meaning, which is to ensure the most efficient way of using public resources. Such conduct may be in conflict with the Act No. 136/2001 Coll. on Protection of Competition as amended that prohibits agreements between competitors restricting competition.
 
To confirm the suspicion and gather further evidence the Office, prior to proceedings, carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of several undertakings in the towns of the Trenčín region, Bratislava region and Banská Bystrica region. During the inspections the employees of the Office gathered various documents, including e - mail communication.
 
Cartels in public procurement (so-called "bid rigging ") are arrangements between some or all bidders in a tender. Cooperation may take the form of agreements on prices, sharing contracts or other form of coordination, including an agreement not to submit a bid or an agreement on rotation of contracts.
 
Since these agreements represent horizontal agreements between direct competitors, which are considered as hard-core cartels, cartel participant may be fined up to 10 % of their turnover for the proceeding closed accounting period. A cartel participant has an option to fully avoid a fine if he was the first to provide, on its own initiative, decisive evidence to prove a violation of the prohibited agreement or was the first to provide, on its own initiative, information and evidence being decisive to perform an inspection. In case a cartel participant provides, on its own initiative, significant evidence, which itself may not be sufficient, but in combination with information and documents already available to the Office, enable the Office to prove a prohibited agreement, the Office shall impose a fine reduced by up to 50% of the amount of the fine that the Office would otherwise impose. Detailed conditions of non-imposing or reducing a fine are summarised in the document “Leniency program” http://www.antimon.gov.sk/files/30/2009/leniency5(k).rtf.
 
In case it is proved that bidder participated in the collusion in public procurement, such bidder shall not take part in public procurements for three years since a final decision confirming existence of an agreement restricting competition is issued. The prohibition does not apply to those who qualify for leniency under the leniency program.
 
Initiation of proceedings neither implies that undertakings are guilty of anti-competitive behaviour; nor prejudge the outcome of the investigation itself.